Supreme Court: Probable Cause for One Offense Does Not Defeat Liability for Malicious Prosecution on Other Offenses

Last month, the Supreme Court held in a 6-3 opinion that when an individual is arrested on multiple charges and subject to some form of unreasonable seizure, such as pretrial detention, a malicious prosecution suit can survive even if only one of the charges that led to a person’s detention is supported by probable cause. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson.

Jascha Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner in Ohio, bought a stolen ring from a thief. When the rightful owners found out, they asked Chiaverini to return their ring, and he refused. The police got involved, requested the return of the ring, and Chiaverini refused. He also revealed to the police that he did not have a license to operate his jewelry store.

The officers arrested Chiaverini and charged him with three counts: one count each of misdemeanor receiving stolen property and dealing in precious metals without a license, and one count of felony money laundering. Chiaverini was detained pending arraignment and a preliminary hearing. The judge found probable cause for all three charges and allowed the case to continue. The charges were later dismissed.

Chiaverini brought suit against the police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, alleging that he was subject to an unreasonable seizure by a government official who charged him with a crime unsupported by probable cause. The officers moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the officers’ motion.

Chiaverini appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. In doing so, the court of appeals focused on the two misdemeanor charges being supported by probable cause and did not address Chiaverini’s claims regarding the felony charge. The Sixth Circuit held that because at least one charge was supported by probable cause, the malicious prosecution suit could not proceed, even if other charges were not supported by probable cause.

Chiaverini filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted. Before the Supreme Court was a circuit split – the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicted with three other courts of appeals that have held that a malicious prosecution claim does not fail just because one charge is supported by probable cause. In addressing the circuit split, the Supreme Court reviewed the existing body of law under the Fourth Amendment, which requires probable cause for pretrial detention. The Court stated detention that is either initiated or prolonged based on an invalid charge is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court also discussed the common-law principles that underly § 1983 and stated that a court’s analysis should focus on common-law torts that are similar in structure to the constitutional violation alleged in a § 1983 suit. The Court stated that Chiaverini’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated by his arrest and detention on a charge lacking probable cause was akin to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution because both are based on the lack of probable cause leading to an unreasonable seizure. The Court provided examples of cases from the late 1800s, analyzing the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, as well as a torts treatise from the era, all of which reached the same conclusion: every single charge does not need to be found improper before an individual can succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution.

The Court held that when analyzing § 1983 suits, courts should address each charge individually and that the presence of probable cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a suit under § 1983 when an individual was charged with multiple offenses. The Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for the appellate court to reconsider Chiaverini’s claim.

Justice Thomas filed a dissent, which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch separately dissented.

Read the full case: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio

Surya A. Iyer

Surya A. Iyer is an associate attorney at Shaw Bransford & Roth. Mr. Iyer recently joined the law firm after completing a clerkship for the Honorable Steven M. Weller in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Prior to his clerkship, Mr. Iyer served as an Assistant District Attorney in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. Mr. Iyer looks forward to transitioning his practice into federal employment law and will be providing representation to employees and federal agencies involved in a variety of issues, including civil and administrative litigation, government investigations, public employee disciplinary actions, and security clearance proceedings.

https://www.shawbransford.com/surya-iyer
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